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ABSTRACT
Commerce is driven by business contracts. Here, each party to such
a contract must be assured that it is robust, fulfilling its goals and
avoiding undesirable outcomes. However, real-life business con-
tracts tend to be complex and unamenable both to manual scrutiny
and domain-independent scientific methods, making it difficult to
provide automated support for determining or improving their ro-
bustness. As a result, establishing a contract is nontrivial and adds
significantly to the transaction costs of conducting business. If the
adoption of multi-agent systems approaches in supporting business
interactions is to be viable, we need to develop appropriate tech-
niques to allow such software to reason about contracts in relation
to their robustness. To this end, in this paper we propose a powerful
approach to assessing the robustness of contracts, and make three
main contributions. First, we demonstrate a novel commitment-
based formal model for contracts. Second, we define rules to eval-
uate the robustness of contracts. Third, we offer a methodology
for modeling contracts to enable checking them for robustness. We
validate these contributions via real-world contracts.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence
General Terms
Design, Reliability
Keywords
Agent commitments, service oriented architectures
1. INTRODUCTION
Business contracts specify the terms under which different con-
tract parties exchange services. In this context, a contract is robust
for a party if it satisfies that party’s goals and preferences. In gen-
eral, practical contracts can be quite complex, usually because each
party inserts clauses to protect its own individual interests. How-
ever, the question of whether such a contract is robust is an impor-
tant one that is not trivial to answer. In fact, the robustness of a
contract may be assessed in different ways. For example, whereas
a contract may specify that a particular service will be provided,
it may not specify how it will be provided, leaving open the pos-
sibility that the method may be inappropriate in the eyes of some
party. Alternatively, a contract may specify exactly what and how
a service should be provided, but make no provision for rectifying
problems when the service fails to be delivered due to accident or
malice.
Two aspects of the complexity of contracts makes ensuring ro-
bustness difficult. First, traditional contracts are not explicitly struc-
tured according to a suitable high-level formal model. Second, the
free text form of today’s contracts complicates analyzing their con-
tent in any automated way. Multiagent systems offer promising
solutions to help manage business relationships and enact business
processes; however, without first assessing the robustness of con-
tracts, agents cannot be relied upon to agree upon or execute con-
tracts of real significance.
In this paper, we provide an approach to modeling contracts
specifically in order to address the problem of unambiguously ana-
lyzing their robustness. We treat a contract as a set of interrelated
commitments among those parties who have signed it. These com-
mitments play differing, interconnected roles in the overall con-
tract and support a formal analysis to determine potential threats
to the robustness of the given contract. For example, robustness is
enhanced when a commitment to provide a service occurs with a
concomitant commitment to resolve problems in cases where that
service could not be delivered.
We make three contributions that together address the problems
of how to analyze contract robustness, and how to design contracts
to ensure that they are robust. First, we provide a structured model
for expressing contracts. Second, we outline a methodology for
identifying the various kinds of commitments that occur in a textual
contract. The methodology helps formalize contracts in terms of
the structured model. Third, we specify rules that can be applied
to the model in order to determine the robustness of the underlying
contract. We motivate our approach using examples from a real
contract; we validate our approach against another real contract.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces our running example. Section 3 describes our structured,
commitment-oriented model of contracts. Section 4 outlines our
methodology for expressing human-oriented contracts in our model.
Section 5 specifies rules governing robustness of contracts. Sec-
tion 6 provides an evaluation using a second case study, and Sec-
tion 7 discusses related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes with
discussion of future directions for research.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
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To illustrate and evaluate our approach, we adopt a real-world
services contract between Advanced Semiconductor Engineering
(ASE) and Motorola.1 The contract is for the assembly and testing
of semiconductor chips, and related services. To save space, we
include only relevant snippets. The preamble identifies the parties
entering into the contract, and why, as the following snippet shows.
Preamble: MANUFACTURING SERVICES AGREE-
MENT... WHEREAS, Motorola and ASE desire to es-
tablish a strategic supplier relationship in which ASE
will utilize the capacity at its final semiconductor man-
ufacturing operation and facilities of ASE Korea lo-
cated at Paju, Korea (the "PAJU FACILITY") on a
priority basis to perform the assembly, test and asso-
ciated services on certain semiconductor products for
Motorola;
The contract includes distinct sections, each grouping clauses
that impose interrelated demands on the contract parties. ASE will
use its facility in Korea to assemble and test semiconductor prod-
ucts (the contract products) for Motorola. Motorola will provide
the requisite specifications and equipment to enable ASE to carry
out its task. Motorola will also provide monthly forecasts to aid
ASE in capacity planning. Motorola will place purchase orders
with ASE for the contract products, upon which ASE will ship the
products to destinations specified by Motorola. ASE will then in-
voice Motorola for payment according to the prices agreed upon in
the contract. Clauses in the contract also cover concerns such as
insurance, indemnity, liability, and so on.
3. A MODEL FOR ROBUST CONTRACTS
A contract is robust in fulfilling agents’ goals under varying cir-
cumstances primarily because of the commitments made in the con-
tractual clauses. It is from these commitments that we can assess
what to expect from agents executing the contract. Therefore, the
first step in our approach is to provide a basic model for contractual
commitments. We go on to describe how robustness can be defined
in terms of such commitments, and then provide an enhanced com-
mitment model specifically designed to model contractual informa-
tion relevant to analyzing robustness.
3.1 Background: Commitments
A commitment C(debtor, creditor, context, antecedent, conse-
quent) corresponds to a reified directed obligation from the debtor
to the creditor to bring about the consequent provided the antecedent
holds. In contractual terms, a commitment represents a proposed
business exchange: the antecedent and consequent represent the
considerations of the creditor and debtor, respectively.
Importantly, a commitment arises within a context, which cap-
tures the legal, social, or community setting in which the commit-
ment is enforced. A subtle feature of our approach is that here the
context can correspond to either a real-life institution or organiza-
tion, such as eBay or the European Union or the famous Blanes
fish market [9]. A context is an active entity: it imposes regula-
tions on the participants, and it might penalize or eject noncom-
pliant participants. The context itself has no consideration in the
business exchange; its function is regulation. Often, the context
plays the role of an arbiter in disputes. Within a contractual setting,
the context typically consists of the legal framework under which
the contract is signed, together with the domain ontology and the
contract document itself. In other words, given a certain legal sys-
tem, understanding of the world, and contract (all of which make
1
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up the context), certain commitments between the contract parties
arise and are manipulated in a natural manner.
More specifically, a contract is a set of commitments, each of
which has the same context. As an example, an ordering process
may involve two commitments: c1 = C(seller, buyer, Org, pay,
shipGoods) and c2 = C(buyer, seller, Org, buyGoods, pay). Here
we use Org as the context within whose scope the contract takes
place. The first commitment requires the seller to ship the goods to
the buyer once payment has been made, whereas the second com-
mits the buyer to pay for goods it has purchased. Notice that the
buyer and the seller may themselves be organizations, each with its
internal structure.
A key benefit of the commitments representation is that com-
mitments can be manipulated in a perspicuous and principled man-
ner, thus yielding the flexibility needed in automated contractual
interactions. A commitment may be created. When its antecedent
holds, it is detached meaning that it reduces to a commitment to
bring about the consequent unconditionally. When its consequent
holds, it is discharged—this could even happen before the com-
mitment is detached. The creditor may assign a commitment to
another agent (creditor). Conversely, a debtor may delegate a com-
mitment to another agent (debtor). A debtor may cancel a commit-
ment and a creditor may release the debtor from the commitment.
Note that the debtor and creditor of a commitment need not be
its direct performer or beneficiary [10]. Often, each would play a
role in a participating organization, and would represent the inter-
est of the organization for the purposes of the commitment. For
example, a manufacturer may commit to repairing some piece of
machinery for a factory, but the repairer may be a subcontractor of
the manufacturer.
3.2 Robustness of a Contract
The robustness of a contract depends on how its commitments
relate to the goals of the contract parties.
Definition 1 relates each of a party’s goals to commitments in the
contract. It says that the fulfillment of a subset of commitments—
in any manner—must lead to the satisfaction of the goal, i.e. the
goal is supported. The set of commitments leading to fulfillment
of the goals may represent either the normal way to fulfill the goals
where all services are delivered successfully, or a compensating
way to fulfill the goals where some commitments are violated but
compensating commitments are fulfilled.
DEFINITION 1. A contract party’s goal is supported by a con-
tract if and only if the fulfillment of the subset of contract commit-
ments, in which the party is the creditor, entails the goal.
Given the above definition, we can then define what it would
mean for a contract to be robust for a party.
DEFINITION 2. A contract is robust for a contract party if all
of the contract party’s goals are supported. A contract is robust
overall if it is robust for all its parties.
In order to specify how to assess robustness, we must define what
it means for (1) a contract party’s goals be entailed by the contract
and (2) a commitment to compensate the failure of another com-
mitment. Both of the above relate to the different types of behavior
a contractual commitment can address. Therefore, it is important
to model the kinds of commitments depending on the purpose they
serve in the contract. Below, we enhance our basic commitment
model to include the specification of commitments based on their
purpose.
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Figure 1: Control flow for the reasoning process
3.3 Enhanced Commitment Structure
From our examination of real-life contracts, we observe that the
commitments occurring within them exhibit a particular structure,
which we exploit to assess the robustness of contracts.
At the heart of this structure is the idea of a service. A service is
the creation of some product by a process under assumed circum-
stances, as shown in Figure 1. The product is what an agent actu-
ally wants, whereas the process is the means by which the product
is brought about. The product may be an artifact or an activity
taking place or something holding true about the world. Signifi-
cantly from the perspective of robustness, it is often the case that
a product can be evaluated by its consumer whereas the process is
usually hidden. The assumed circumstances constitute normal, ex-
pected operation: a contract sets up expectations about what each
party will do and does so assuming the rest of the world works in
a particular way. Considering these assumed circumstances allows
us also to consider what should happen when they do not hold in
some way.
We view contracts as inherently symmetric among the parties.
Thus each party potentially provides one or more services to the
others. A service commitment is, then, a commitment on a debtor
in the role of providing a service to a creditor. It states what is to
be produced by the service and under what assumed circumstances,
without further describing the product or process. In terms of the
overall structure of a commitment described in Section 3.1, the ser-
vice product is the consequent of the commitment.
A contract contains a set of service commitments. For each ser-
vice, there are then a number of other constraints and commitments
that are meaningful when understood in context of the service.
• Quality constraints, with regard to a service, are restrictions
on the debtor to ensure that the service product is of a mini-
mum acceptable quality.
• Implementation constraints, with regard to a service, are re-
strictions on the debtor to ensure that the process used for
production meets certain requirements.
• A contingency commitment, with regard to a service, is a
commitment on the debtor or a third party to provide an alter-
native service when the assumed circumstances do not hold
(and stated contingency circumstances hold instead).
• A resolution commitment, with regard to a service, is a com-
mitment on the debtor or a third party to provide an alterna-
tive service when the service commitment is violated.
• An audit commitment, with regard to a service, is a commit-
ment on the debtor or a third party to perform an audit of
the service, the product of which is the record of the service
having been conducted.
Using this enhanced structure, we model a contract as a set of
such commitments. The structure for documenting one commit-
ment is shown in Table 1. As in Section 3.1, each contract has a
Creditor and a Debtor agent. The antecedent is divided into an
Activation condition, which states what triggers the commitment to
apply, and Assumed circumstances, which states what is assumed
to hold when the commitment applies. Both must be true for the
commitment to apply, but they are dealt with in different ways. If
the Activation condition does not hold at some time, then the com-
mitment simply does not apply at that time. Conversely, if the Acti-
vation condition holds but the Assumed circumstances do not, then
the Contingency commitment applies instead (if one is given).
The consequent is similarly divided into parts: for the conse-
quent to be true, the Product must have been produced such that
the Quality properties hold true of the service product and the Im-
plementation properties hold true of the service process.
Additional related commitments are also modeled. A Resolution
commitment is applicable when this commitment is violated (this
is the antecedent of the resolution commitment). An Audit commit-
ment is applicable whenever this commitment’s process is enacted
(the same or a more general antecedent than this commitment), and
produces documentation regarding the service process.
A contract modeled so as to analyze robustness then, is a set of
enhanced commitments, EC(creditor, debtor, activation, assumed,
product, quality, implementation), together with functions between
commitments, resolution, contingency and audit, each of which
maps from a commitment to a set of (related) commitments.
Table 1: Enhanced commitment structure to assess robustness
Enhanced Commitment Structure
Reference An identifier to refer to the commitment
Creditor The beneficiary of the service
Debtor The party responsible for providing the ser-
vice
Antecedent
Activation Under what circumstances this commitment
applies
Assumed Circumstances assumed in providing service
Consequent
Product The product of the service
Quality The properties that should hold for the prod-
uct
Implementation The properties that should have held for the
service process
Related
Contingency A commitment regarding what should be
done when the assumed circumstances do not
hold (referred to by identifier)
Resolution A commitment regarding what should be
done when this commitment is violated (re-
ferred to by identifier)
Audit A commitment to produce data about how
this service is performed (referred to by iden-
tifier)
4. A METHODOLOGY FOR CONTRACT RO-
BUSTNESS
Given this structured model for expressing contracts in a way
that is appropriate to analyzing their robustness, we are now able to
present a methodology for determining whether a contract is robust
or not. This has two stages: first, it involves mapping the contract
text to the commitments model introduced in Table 1; and second
it involves applying rules to this mapping to check for robustness.
The first phase of our methodology consists of a number of steps,
with each step identifying certain artifacts within the contract, and
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testing whether these artifacts meet some basic rules to ensure the
contract is correct and robust in trivial ways. For example, this
might mean ensuring that no commitment has the same creditor as
debtor, and that it is clear when the contract begins and ends to
have force. In the next section (Section 5), we introduce the more
rigorous robustness rules, which may not hold even for apparently
well-drafted contracts.
Our methodology consists of the following steps. For each, we
give the number of the section in this paper in which the step is
explained.
1. Identify the critical entities involved in the commitments (4.1)
(a) Identify contract parties (4.1.1)
(b) Identify each contract party’s goals (4.1.2)
(c) Identify domain concepts (4.1.3)
(d) Identify contract scope (4.1.4)
2. Map the above entities into the commitment model (4.2)
(a) Model services, processes, and products (4.2.1)
(b) Model commitments regarding services (4.2.2)
3. Check the robustness of the commitments (5)
(a) Check that the contract meets each party’s goals (5.1)
(b) Check that it is well specified how services should be
provided and how to handle circumstances in which
they are not (5.2)
(c) Check that the contract does not place conflicting de-
mands on the parties (5.3)
We illustrate the methodology via clauses selected from the ASE-
Motorola contract, especially an abbreviated form of Clause 11.
Clause 11: ASE shall ship the Contract Products to
the destinations identified by Motorola. Motorola shall
acknowledge to ASE the receipt of each shipment of
Contract Products, stating the quantity and type of,
and any damages existing at delivery to, such Contract
Products within [X days] of receipt at Motorola’s ul-
timate destination . . . ASE shall certify to Motorola
with each shipment that the Contract Products con-
tained therein have successfully passed applicable test-
ing and meet all specifications . . . If Motorola rejects
any Contract Products, Motorola and ASE shall confer
to determine the reason for the rejection. ASE shall
immediately exercise commercially reasonable efforts
to develop and implement a corrective action plan for
any errors, including manufacturing errors or defects,
identified in its systems.
4.1 Entity Identification
It is crucial to identify the various artifacts referred to in the
contract. These artifacts may then be used within commitments in
some structured or unstructured manner. In the former case, rules
may be created identifying how they may, or should, be used in
order to lead to a robust contract. The following entities are of
interest.
4.1.1 Contract Parties
A contract party named by the contract is an entity whose com-
mitments and responsibilities are described by the contract, and
which is a signatory to the contract. In Clause 11, ASE and Mo-
torola are contract parties.
A contract may identify specific roles within a contract party,
when it is an organization. For example, ASE is committed to
providing Motorola Employees with office facilities according to
Clause 5 (not shown). Other roles mentioned in the contract in-
clude that of a coordinator, and the ASE account team, which then
includes additional roles such as manager and executive.
4.1.2 Contract Goals
Business parties adopt a contract if it is conducive to achiev-
ing their goals—if the contract is robust, then these goals will be
achieved. The preamble specifies the overarching goal; here, this is
the successful production and delivery of semiconductor products
from ASE to Motorola. This leads to other identifiable subgoals re-
garding high-level concepts such as the goal of having ASE deliver
the product in a timely manner, the defect rate falling below some
threshold, and so on. As we discuss below, each of these goals must
be satisfied by some combination of commitments specified in the
contract.
4.1.3 Domain Concepts
Contracts specify what the contract parties are committed to do
within some domain, specifying the relevant states of domain arti-
facts and how to manipulate them. Domain concepts in Clause 11
include ‘products’, ‘rejection’, ‘receipt’, ‘destination’, ‘damage’,
among others. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, we
assume a suitable ontology for each domain.
4.1.4 Scoping
A robust contract should specify when it is in effect, and when
it expires, for example via a termination clause, which specifies the
conditions under which the contract ends. Clause 3 (not shown)
within the Motorola-ASE contract states that the contract is effec-
tive from the signing date, and is in force for five years. It also
provides alternative ways of terminating the contract early. A basic
requirement of robustness is clarity of the scope.
BASIC RULE 1. A robust contract specifies the conditions when
the contract begins and ends.
4.2 Mapping to Commitment Model
Once the critical entities have been identified, we map this infor-
mation into our commitment-based model.
4.2.1 Services, Processes, and Products
Clearly, it is necessary to identify the services to which the con-
tractual commitments apply. For each service, its product — that
is, its desired outcome — must also be identified. Each service
is expressed, or sometimes implied, in contract clauses using the
identified domain concepts, and each party’s goals are expressed in
terms of the services.
The Preamble in our example contract describes the primary ser-
vices under consideration, as follows: “the assembly, test and asso-
ciated services on high quality semiconductor products in volume”.
This hints at a service whose product is assembled semiconductor
products and a service whose product is tested semiconductor prod-
ucts. Later clauses identify other ‘associated’ services. For exam-
ple, Clause 11 includes “ASE shall ship the Contract Products to
the destinations identified by Motorola”, the product of which is
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the delivery of goods, and goes on to make statements about how
this service should be provided.
4.2.2 Commitments Regarding Services
Because we view a contract as an aggregation of the commit-
ments it imposes upon the contract parties, determining whether a
contract is robust involves identifying the commitments found in
the contract. The remainder of the methodology focuses on these
commitments, and the relationships between them.
Each service identified in the contract has a corresponding com-
mitment, with one identified party as debtor, and another as cred-
itor. Since commitments are, in effect, directed obligations, it is
a basic prerequisite to robust execution that any commitment must
have a contract party (and sometimes a specific role within it) as
the commitment’s debtor and creditor, implying the following rule.
BASIC RULE 2. A robust contract must ensure that every com-
mitment within the contract will have a contract party as a debtor
and a creditor.
For the primary shipment service referred to in Clause 11, the
creditor is Motorola and the debtor is ASE. Further, a valid com-
mitment must have distinct parties as debtor and creditor.
BASIC RULE 3. The same entity may not be named a debtor
and a creditor within a single commitment.
Finally, the given contract must translate unambiguously to our
formal model, and so the following basic rule applies.
BASIC RULE 4. A commitment must only refer to concepts that
have been defined within some (domain) ontology.
4.2.3 Example
Table 2: Service commitment to provide shipment service
Model for Commitment to Shipment Service
Reference C11-Shipment
Creditor Motorola
Debtor ASE
Antecedent
Activation When products ready to ship
Assumed
Consequent
Product Products arrived at specified Motorola site
Quality No damage to products
Implementation Perform applicable tests to certify products
Related
Contingency
Resolution C11-Rejection
Audit C11-Receipt
Audit C11-Quality
We apply the above to the initial modeling of Clause 11. Table 2
expresses the commitment to perform the primary service of the
clause, shipment of products to specified destinations. This com-
mitment is given an identifier, C11-Shipment, and refers to three
other commitments extracted from the clause: C11-Rejection, C11-
Receipt, and C11-Quality. For brevity, we omit the models for the
latter two audit commitments; those refer to Motorola’s commit-
ment to provide a timely receipt for products received, and ASE’s
commitment to provide a statement of quality, respectively. The
resolution commitment, C11-Rejection, is invoked when the ser-
vice product is not achieved, the commitment to quality (no dam-
age) is violated, or the commitment to implementation (tests per-
formed) is not fulfilled.
Table 3 shows the model for C11-Rejection. Here, the service
performed is the correction of the cause of rejection. No further
commitment is involved, as the clause does not specify what should
be done to audit the commitment or in contingency situations.
Table 3: Commitment to rectify problems (rejected products)
Model for Commitment to Act in Case of Rejection
Reference C11-Rejection
Creditor Motorola
Debtor ASE
Antecedent
Activation Motorola rejects delivered products
Assumed Within X days of delivery
Consequent
Product Corrective plan of action developed and im-
plemented by ASE
Quality
Implementation
Related
Contingency
Resolution
Audit
5. ROBUSTNESS RULES
Given the model of contracts in the preceding section, we now
specify rules for determining the robustness of contracts expressed
in that model. We divide such rules into:
1. those that determine whether the contract contains the con-
tent required by each party;
2. those that determine whether each contract commitment is
handled robustly; and
3. those that apply to consistency between commitments.
5.1 Necessity Robustness Rules
A robust contract must ensure that each contract party’s goals
are satisfied when the contract executes correctly. The consequent
of a service commitment may be used to capture the commitment’s
creditor’s goals (when the commitment’s antecedent holds). There-
fore, the desired outcome of a contract may be captured by some
subset of the contract’s service commitments. A robust contract
must thus satisfy the following rule.
ROBUSTNESS RULE 1. Each goal expected to be satisfied by
the contract parties should be (a necessary implication of) the con-
sequent of a service commitment.
Applying this to our example, the commitments shown in Ta-
bles 2 and 3 may be judged to be robust with regard to this rule:
on the former’s completion, Motorola will have the components it
desires; on the latter’s completion, any problems will have been
appropriately addressed.
5.2 Coverage Robustness Rules
A service commitment can often be fulfilled in different ways,
and not all are of equal value to the contract parties. In order to be
robust, the contract must ensure that a commitment is met appro-
priately.
ROBUSTNESS RULE 2. Each service commitment must have cor-
responding quality constraints that specify what it means for the
service product to achieve an adequate standard.
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Table 2 shows a simple statement of the quality required of the
product: no damage should have occurred. In the commitment in
Table 3, no quality constraints are given. Whereas this omission
may be deemed appropriate by the contract parties, the above rule
highlights the fact that the contract is less robust if Motorola places
no criteria on what an acceptable corrective plan can be.
Whereas the quality constraints concern the service product, we
may also have criteria for judging the process by which the service
is conducted, leading to the following rule.
ROBUSTNESS RULE 3. If a service commitment may be met in
a number of ways, a proper subset of which capture the creditor’s
goals, then the service commitment should have corresponding im-
plementation constraints that specify what it means for the service
commitment to have been achieved in a satisfactory manner.
Table 2 shows a commitment by ASE to apply tests for damage
and to ensure specifications are met prior to delivery (and therefore
part of the service process). In contrast, Table 3 gives no imple-
mentation commitment. The above rule highlights the fact that the
contract is less robust if Motorola places no criterion on what pro-
cess is acceptable in developing a corrective plan, for example what
factors ASE should take into account.
The fulfillment of service commitments and quality constraints
is usually publicly observable. For example, whether ASE has
manufactured the semiconductor chips up to the requisite standard
is verifiable by Motorola once Motorola has received the chips.
However, implementation constraints restrict the internal processes
a contract party employs; compliance with such commitments is
not visible outside the company. For example, Motorola cannot
ascertain from outside ASE whether ASE has met the ISO 9000
standards in manufacturing the chips. Hence, implementation con-
straints call for audit commitments.
ROBUSTNESS RULE 4. Each service’s implementation constraints
must have a corresponding audit commitment that ensures that the
satisfaction or violation of the constraints is detected.
If a commitment has been violated (for example, if the product
is not available, or if quality or implementation constraints haven’t
been followed), then the creditors’ goals may not be achieved. In
order to be robust, therefore, the creditor in the commitment re-
quires that some compensating commitment comes into force.
ROBUSTNESS RULE 5. Each commitment must have a corre-
sponding resolution commitment that ensures that the violation of
the former commitment results in a suitable sanction on the debtor.
Table 2 shows two commitments to ensure correct auditing by
both parties involved. It is only by auditing that any violations of
the implementation constraints are detected. There is also a resolu-
tion commitment, to specify what should be done when the product
or process is inadequate according to the quality and implementa-
tion constraints. Table 3 shows no audit or resolution commitments
are given. The above rules highlight the fact that the contract is
less robust if there is no record of ASE having produced and imple-
mented such a corrective plan, or what action to take if ASE fails
to produce such a plan.
Further, for the debtors of a contract commitment, the contract is
robust only if it adequately accounts for exceptional circumstances,
beyond those assumed in normal operation. We ensure the robust-
ness of the contracts in relation to these aspects, with the following
rule.
Table 4: Contract Rules
Rule Target
BASIC RULE 1 Scope of contract
BASIC RULE 2 & 3 Services and contract parties
BASIC RULE 4 Well defined contract
ROBUSTNESS RULE 1 Product
ROBUSTNESS RULE 2 Quality constraints
ROBUSTNESS RULE 3 Implementation constraints
ROBUSTNESS RULE 4 Audit commitments
ROBUSTNESS RULE 5 Resolution commitments
ROBUSTNESS RULE 6 Contingency commitments
ROBUSTNESS RULE 6. Each commitment may have correspond-
ing contingency commitments that ensure that, in each exceptional
circumstance envisaged, the violation of the former commitment
does not result in an inappropriate sanction on the debtor.
Table 2 shows no contingency commitments because the contract
fails to specify assumed circumstances. The absence of assump-
tions should draw the modelers’ attention, but may merely indicate
that there is no contingency to consider. Table 3 also states no con-
tingency commitment, but does have assumed circumstances. The
above rule highlights the fact that the contract is less robust if it is
not specified what should be done if Motorola only rejects a prod-
uct long after (more than X days) it has been delivered.
It might seem that, if applied recursively, the above rules could
lead to an infinitely large contract; for example, each commitment
requires another commitment for resolution. However, our use of
the context of a contract—as in a business contract within a wider
legal system—provides a natural solution. Not all of the associ-
ated commitments mentioned in the rules above need to be in the
contract document itself; many may be present in the wider con-
text. Ultimately, the audit, resolution, or contingencies of contex-
tual commitments may be captured via general approaches, such as
“file a lawsuit”.
5.3 Consistency Robustness Rules
The above rules consider the requirements of robustness on each
commitment. The robustness of a contract as a whole depends in
addition on whether its commitments are realizable.
It should always be clear to a contract party what to do to fulfill
the contract, even in the case of multiple failures. Further, if suc-
cess in one commitment prevents success in another, then the con-
tract cannot be robust. A particular example of this is where two
commitments require the same party in the same system state to do
two conflicting things. A robust contract does not have such con-
flicts between its commitments, and the following rule expresses
this constraint.
ROBUSTNESS RULE 7. For any given contract party and ap-
plicable system state, by performing an action necessary to avoid
violating one commitment, the action should not violate any other-
wise nonviolated commitment.
Taken together, the rules specified above provide us with a means
of ensuring that a contract is robust at the point of specification. The
full set of rules is summarized in Table 4, indicating which aspects
of the contract each rule applies to.
6. EVALUATION
We used the Motorola-ASE contract as primary inspiration for
our approach to modeling and assessing contract robustness (along
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with our prior experience with case studies as part of electronic
contracting projects). To evaluate the approach, we took an entirely
independent contract and applied the methodology. Figure 2 shows
an excerpt from a short contract2 between a juggling society and
an event organizer. We now show how our methodology applies to
determine whether this contract is robust.
Contract For: Canterbury Centre Dinner 2003 (“CCD”),
Friday 6 June 2003, 24 High Street, Canterbury.
This agreement is entered into between the University Juggling
Club (“UJC”) and the Canterbury Center Dinner 2003 on the
following terms:
1. Service Provider: University Juggling Club.
2. Employer: Canterbury Center Dinner.
3. To be provided by UJC: Performers: J Woods (juggler);
one other juggler; all equipment necessary for perfor-
mance.
4. To be provided by CCD: Cloakroom.
5. Venue address: 24 High Street, Canterbury.
6. CCD understands that performances are restricted in
venues with ceilings of insufficient height. The ideal
height is 5 meters. Outside performances are restricted
in rain or strong winds.
7. Date of Performance: Friday 6 June 2003, starting at
6:30PM.
8. Duration of Performance: 1.5 hours. Short (less than one
minute) breaks are part of the performance.
9. Fee: £30 per juggler + £10 expenses + £90 insurance
(total £160).
10. If UJC is forced to cancel, all monies (including £90 de-
posit) will be refunded in full. If the Employer cancels
with at least 24 hours notice, UJC will retain £90 and
return any other monies.
11. Should poor weather mean that the Event takes place in-
doors, UJC will refund £10 expenses.
12. Performers will not consume any alcohol until after com-
pletion of services as agreed upon.
13. CCD will be responsible for compensation UJC for dam-
age to equipment caused by those attending the Event
unless damage is caused when (if) Performers have left
equipment unguarded.
14. UJC will be liable for any injury sustained by a guest at
the Event if such injury results from provision of services
as agreed upon in this contract unless the Event fails to
provide a suitable area for performance.
Figure 2: An extract from a contract to provide juggling ser-
vices
6.1 Entity Identification
The two contract parties involved in this contract are the Juggling
Club (UJC), and the Canterbury Centre Dinner (CCD). Additional
roles include performer and juggler. As we see below, this contract
obeys Basic Rules 2 and 3.
The CCD’s goal from the contract is to obtain performers for
their dinner. The UJC’s goal is to get paid.
Apart from temporal concepts (relating to dates and times), and
general concepts such as money, we may identify the domain con-
cepts listed in Table 5. Since only these concepts are referred to
within the contract, Basic Rule 4 is satisfied.
2
http://users.ox.ac.uk/ juggsoc/contract.shtml
Table 5: Domain concepts for the Juggler contract
performance equipment deposit damage venue
performance area cloakroom height outside break
poor weather expenses alcohol indoors guests
consumption cancellation injury guarding
The contract initiates as soon as it is signed and, it is implicitly
implied that it expires at the end of the performance. Note that
the lack of an explicit expiration condition suggests one problem
with the robustness of the contract. One may envision a situation
where some equipment is damaged, and a disagreement arises as
to whether this damage falls under the contract or not (for exam-
ple, when the jugglers and guests are on their way home from the
dinner). Thus, Basic Rule 1 is not satisfied within this contract.
6.2 Mapping to Commitment Model
We now map clauses from the contract to the commitment model.
Clauses 3 to 7 imply a service to be provided: the provision of
jugglers and equipment by UJC, modeled in Table 6. UJC is the
debtor, CCD is the creditor and the eventual product of the service
is that the jugglers perform at the event. Implementation constraints
are specified: that the jugglers remain sober (Clause 12). Where
the service cannot be provided due to poor weather conditions (as-
sumed circumstances not holding, Clause 11) or the performance is
canceled by UJC (violation of commitment under assumed circum-
stances, Clause 10), contingency and resolution commitments ap-
ply, respectively. Clause 9 is a commitment for a separate payment-
for-juggling service, and so is not modeled here.
Table 6: Service commitment: provide jugglers, equipment
Model for Commitment to Provide Resources
Reference C-ProvisionOfResources
Creditor CCD (2)
Debtor UJC (1)
Antecedent
Activation Agreement to contract
Assumed Venue is indoor and of adequate height or
outdoor and there is no rain or strong winds
(6)
Consequent
Product C-JugglerPerform (3,4,5,7)
Quality C-PerformanceFor1.5Hours (8)
Implementation C-JugglersWillNotConsumeAlcohol (12)
Related
Contingency C-PoorWeather (11)
Contingency C-Cancellation (10)
Resolution C-CompensationResponsibility (13)
Resolution C-Injury-Liability (14)
6.3 Assessing Robustness
Having identified the commitments, we may check whether they
meet the appropriate robustness rules. Clearly, each desired out-
come of the contract meets the commitments specified in Clauses 3,
4, 7, 8 and 9, as a performance will take place, and UJC will be
paid. Thus, Rule 1 is satisfied.
According to Rule 2, each service commitment must have as-
sociated quality constraints. Whereas one assessment of quality is
given for the service in Table 6, and so the clause can be judged
somewhat robust, other quality measures may also be considered
(for example, specifying how capable the juggler should be).
UJC agrees to implementation constraints: that the jugglers do
not consume alcohol while performing. Note that although there
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is no corresponding audit commitment, this is only because the
performance will happen in public and CCD would easily be able
to detect noncompliance. Thus Rule 4 is satisfied. The parties
may consider additional implementation constraints, for example
if there are any stipulations that should be made about how the
product is reached, such as whether the organizers are given prior
warning about when the jugglers will arrive.
There are some commitments for contingency and resolution in
Table 6. Therefore, there is some robustness in this regard accord-
ing to Rules 5 and 6. However, the contract can be even more robust
if consideration is made of the other ways in which the assumed cir-
cumstances may not come about or the service is not provided. For
example, the assumed circumstances are a conjunction of criteria
and the contract does not say how to handle jugglers arriving at
a venue with too low a ceiling. Similarly, the quality constraints
require jugglers to remain sober, but there is no means of redress
specified if this commitment is violated.
The juggling contract’s inability to deal with such unexpected
situations, together with its vagueness, means that it lacks robust-
ness in several ways, and that in unexpected situations, disagree-
ments between the parties may occur that the contract may be un-
able to resolve.
7. RELATED WORK
Much work has been done on using automated contracts within
computer science, and particularly within the area of multi-agent
systems. It is possible to categorize this work based on the contract
lifecycle. Our work in this paper concerns itself with the first stage
of the contract lifecycle, namely contract drafting. In this phase,
issues such as the precise language used to represent the contract
are important, as well as issues such as contract negotiation [2] and
contract validation. Once a contract is drafted, it comes into effect,
and issues such as contract monitoring and enforcement [4] become
important, but are not further discussed here.
Our work also ignores the plethora of contract languages that
have been proposed [1, 7, 6], instead abstracting a contract to the
level of commitments. Similarly, we ignore how a contract comes
into being, concentrating instead only on whether it is robust or not.
Thus, our work falls into the area of contract validation.
However, most work on contract validation concerns itself with
either ensuring that contract clauses are consistent [3], or ensuring
that a sound legal basis exists [5]. The notion of robustness adds
to, rather than replaces these concerns.
The only other large scale analysis of contractual requirements
we are aware of, is the work of Daskalopulu et al., investigating
how to support large engineering contracts [3]. However, their
work was focused on identifying language requirements for such
contracts.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we identified the notion of robustness as critical
to a contract. Informally, a robust contract is one that meets the
contracting parties’ goals for the contract, and handles unexpected
situations gracefully. We proposed a methodology for determining
whether a contract is robust, and evaluated portions of this method-
ology on portions of two real contracts. Our approach models con-
tracts such that their robustness is assessed in a structured manner.
However, many open questions remain.
First, it would be interesting to map the notions of robustness into
an existing contract language such as [8], and to automate the rules
for robustness, creating an algorithm that may identify whether a
contract is robust or not. It would also be useful to study a large
number of additional contracts, and see whether our rules for ro-
bustness are exhaustive, or should be altered in some way. Fur-
ther, it may be possible to identify additional commonly occurring
classes of commitments, together with associated robustness rules.
The notion of robustness becomes increasingly important as agents
autonomously negotiate and create contracts between themselves.
By creating a robust contract, able to state what should occur in all
situations (within the context of the contract), an agent’s cognitive
load is reduced, as it does not need to reason about whether the con-
tract was adhered to or not. Furthermore, robust contracts minimize
the situations in which humans need to intervene in order to handle
agent disagreements. While many open issues remain, we believe
that this paper provides a good initial approach to identifying and
creating robust contracts.
9. REFERENCES
[1] A. S. Abrahams and J. M. Bacon. A software
implementation of Kimbrough’s disquotation theory for
representing and enforcing electronic commerce contracts.
Group Decision and Negotiation, 11(6):487 – 524, 2002.
[2] D. Carbogim and D. Robertson. Contract-based negotiation
via argumentation (a preliminary report). In Workshop on
Multi-Agent Systems in Logic Programming (MAS99) at the
International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP99),
1999.
[3] A. Daskalopulu. Logic-based tools for legal contract
drafting: Prospects and problems. In Proc. of the First Logic
Symposium, pages 213–222, 1997.
[4] A. Daskalopulu, T. Dimitrakos, and T. Maibaum.
Evidence-based electronic contract performance monitoring.
Group Decision and Negotiation, 11(6):469–485, 2002.
[5] M. Gisler, K. Staneovska-Slabeva, and M. Greunz. Legal
aspects of electronic contracts. In Infrastructures for dynamic
business-to-business service outsourcing (IDSO’00), 2000.
[6] G. Governatori. Representing business contracts in ruleml.
International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems,
14(2–3):181–216, 2005.
[7] B. Grosof and T. C. Poon. SweetDeal: Representing agent
contracts with exceptions using semantic web rules,
ontologies, and process descriptions. International Journal
of Electronic Commerce, 8(4):61–98, 2004.
[8] N. Oren, S. Panagiotidi, J. Vazquez-Salceda, S. Modgil,
M. Luck, and S. Miles. Towards a formalisation of electronic
contracting environments. In Proceedings of Coordination,
Organization, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems, the
International Workshop at AAAI 2008, pages 61–68,
Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2008.
[9] J. A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, F. J. Martín, P. Noriega, P. Garcia,
and C. Sierra. Towards a test-bed for trading agents in
electronic auction markets. AI Communications, 11(1):5–19,
1998.
[10] M. P. Singh. An ontology for commitments in multiagent
systems: Toward a unification of normative concepts.
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7:97–113, 1999.
8
